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PILOT DECISION MAKING: MODELING CHOICES IN GO-AROUND SITUATIONS  
 
Andreas Haslbeck, Armin Eichinger, Klaus Bengler 
Institute of Ergonomics, Technische Universität München 
Munich, Germany 
 
Pilot decision making is highly influenced by cockpit information displays. Decision quality could 
benefit from knowledge of temporal and individual influences on decision making under time 
pressure that suggests leverage points for cockpit or process design. In a recent flight simulator 
experiment, airline pilots were presented a realistic landing scenario. During the approach phase, 
instruments indicated weather conditions suggesting a go-around decision to be taken. The 
alternative decision consists of landing in spite of illegitimate strong tailwind. Gaze tracking 
analysis identified, whether relevant display information was picked up by the pilots. The time 
between checking the aircraft’s wind indicator and the moment of decision was taken as predictor 
of choice to go-around. Modeling of pilots’ choice behavior shows strong influences of the 
predictor analyzed. A comparison of long-haul captains and short-haul first officers shows 
dependency of decision-behavior on level of practice and training.  
 
Introduction 
 
One important aspect of good airmanship is pilots’ decision making (FAA, 2004; DeMaria, 2006). A pilot’s 
ability to soundly decide duly prevents hazardous situations. While several aspects of good airmanship like manual 
flying skills can be taught and exercised at flight school, long-term experience is needed to build up comprehensive 
knowledge for an aviator to find appropriate decisions in a certain situation. One potentially hazardous situation is 
the approach phase, representing more than one third of all fatal accidents (IATA, 2011; Boeing, 2012). Two typical 
accident categories defined by the International Air Transport Association are runway excursions (23% of IATA 
listed aircraft accidents in 2010) and hard landing (5%). In-depth analysis has shown, that in 35% of the runway 
excursions in 2010, meteorology has been a contributing factor. To complement this information, in one fourth of all 
cases, the flight crew has failed to go-around after an unstabilized approach (IATA, 2011). The safety reports of the 
years before have shown very similar numbers and evidence. One lesson to be learned from these reports is that a 
go-around can be a safe decision to master the high-risk situation of a hazardous approach.  
 
Taxonomy of go-around behavior 
 
The focus of this experiment is the pilots’ behavior in an approach scenario, where a go-around has to be 
performed by the pilot flying (PF) because of an illegitimate high tailwind (Table 1). The PF should be aware of this 
wind situation and trigger the go-around by himself (type 1). If he is not aware of the tailwind, a cue by the pilot 
monitoring (PM) can lead the PF to trigger the go-around (type 2). In both cases it may happen that the PF does not 
trigger the go-around because of a decision to land in spite of the tailwind (type 3) or because of not being aware of 
the wind even when a cue is given (type 4).  
 
Table 1.  
Different types of pilots’ behavior concerning the decision of a go-around. 
 pilot is aware of wind situation pilot is not aware of wind situation
pilot is going around (PGA) Type 1 Type 2 
pilot is not going around (PnGA) Type 3 Type 4 
 
For type 1 und 2 the time intervals between different wind checks can be calculated (Figure 1). If a pilot is 
aware of a wind potentially differing from the ATC information, he should early perform a first wind check (t1) in 
the final approach (below 1,000 ft above ground level) and should repeat this check continuously until a final 
decision to (not) go around is made. The final wind check before the go-around is also measured (t2). If only one 
wind check is performed first and last check time coincide (t1=t2).    
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Figure 1. Times measured between different wind checks. 
As third gaze indicator the time duration between first (t1) and final (t2) wind check (t1-t2) can be calculated. 
 
Research Questions 
 
One research question of this study is: Does the amount of experience influence pilots‘ decision making 
behavior? In a first analysis two groups of pilots that differ in their level of training are compared in regard of 
frequencies of go-around behavior as described in Table 1. In a second analysis, this behavior is further detailed 
independently from the two different groups in terms of related underlying mechanisms?   
 
Dual-process influences on pilot decision making. To understand the mechanisms underlying these go-
around decisions, we put them in context of established behavioral taxonomies and propose continuous usage of 
relevant information displays as an important predictor of decision making. Many process-models of pilot decision 
making in a first step assess the situation by observing information and data scanning (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2008; 
Orasanu, 1995) and branch out depending on the interpretation of this assessment. A central source of decision 
errors is thereby made explicit: the lack of consideration of important data displays; a perceptual step that also builds 
the foundational level of Endsley’s conception of situation awareness (e. g. Endsley, 2006). 
What are the driving forces for pilots to consider relevant information sources, i.e. important data displays? 
Rasmussen’s classification of action identifying skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behavior can help to 
localize relevant mechanisms (Rasmussen, 1983). As designers of man-machine interfaces we intend to facilitate 
behavior that is situated near the lower, skill-based part of the taxonomy. The reason for this is illuminated when put 
in context of dual-process theories of thinking and decision making (e. g. Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Fredricks, 
2002; Kahneman, 2003, 2011). Skill-based behavior is a function of system 1 whose processes are automatic, 
opaque, and effortless (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 is a highly flexible regulatory entity with potential control of 
system 1 suggestions for action. Its processes are slow, self-aware, and effortful. Behavior on a skill-based level 
requires less effort and induces less workload than rule- or knowledge-based behavior that is in the domain of 
system 2. From an energetic self-regulatory perspective that leads to the tendency to invest not more effort than is 
required in a task. System 2 usually endorses system 1 suggestions and activities; especially in domains of skilled 
performance. 
Recognizing these dependencies the importance of defaults in action selection has to be focused. Using 
defaults allows automatic behavior by reducing effort necessary for information acquisition and weighing different 
courses of action (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). According to O’Hare (2003), “it will be easier to continue with an 
existing course of action than to change to a new one” (p. 223). So pilots will sometimes tend to stick to unsuitable 
skill- or rule-based behavior, where analytical knowledge-based strategies would be appropriate (O’Hare, 2003).  
Based on these considerations of the interplay of system 1 and system 2 there is one central conjecture on 
pilot behavior: Variability is to be expected in the influence of system 1 and system 2 on decision making. This 
variability leads to different degrees of endorsement of less effortful behavioral or decision strategies. We suppose 
two possible consequences of these strategies: Variability in investing effort in data acquisition behavior and 
variability in sticking to default decision options. We suppose that these behavioral tendencies have clear influences 
on the decision to go around. 
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Hypotheses 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Pilots with a high level of expertise will come to ‘better’ decisions based upon 
good air
d 
According to this demarcation, two different, mutually exclusive gaze behaviors would 
result as
heck between PnGA and PGA. There is a difference between first and final wind check 
between
n PnGA and PGA. There is a difference between first and final wind check between PnGA and 
GA (Figure 2).   
 
Research
manship. 
The consequences of potential effort reducing strategies described above might become manifest in 
different gaze strategies for pilots that finally take the decision to go around (PGA) versus those pilots that woul
presumably take the decision to land in spite of strong tailwind and a cue from the PM (PnGA). The difference 
between these two groups might stem from different information acquisition strategies or from different use of 
default decision options. 
 a consequence: 
Research Hypothesis 2: Pilots not intending to go around (PnGA) perceive relevant information too late or 
not at all. That is expressed by the following gaze profile: First wind check is later for PnGA than for PGA. There is 
no difference in final wind c
 PnGA and PGA.   
Research Hypothesis 3: Pilots intending to land (PnGA) stick to a default option; up to the point of 
deciding to choose the default of landing, information acquisition does not differ from PGA. That is expressed by 
the following gaze profile: First wind check is not differing between PnGA and PGA. There is a difference in final 
wind check betwee
P
 
Figure 2 ime charts for wind checks concerning hypotheses 2 and 3. 
 
Method 
Particip ts 
levels of 
t 
 
ent = 
 a 
 wear 
uniforms and to bring their own computer for the electronic flight bag system (Haslbeck et al., 2012). 
Scenario
ning 
n 
. T
 
an
 
This study has been undertaken in cooperation with a major European airline. Pilots with different 
practice and training were scheduled for a flight simulator experiment by their operations department; i. e. 
participation was not voluntary. Twenty-six long-haul captains (CPTs) flying Airbus A330/340 types participated 
the experiment in a full flight simulator (JAR-STD 1A Level D) with A340-600 configuration and twenty-seven firs
officers (FOs) scheduled on the A 320 short-haul fleet participated in an equivalent A320-200 full flight simulator.
The CPTs had a lower level of practice and training, because of their flight school attendance was more way back 
and they had only few long-haul operations per month (mean value of own performed landings in the 30 days prior 
to the experiment = 3.4). As contrasting group, younger FOs coming recently from flight school face a high number 
of short-haul operations per month (mean value of own performed landings in the 30 days prior to the experim
16.6). Flight experience (total flight hours) is diametrically opposed to the level of practice and training. All 
participants had the role of the (PF). A confederate PM complemented the aircrew and was instructed to play
rather passive roll but to avoid errors. All pilots were scheduled on the airline’s corresponding fleet, held an 
appropriate license (ATPL) and were asked to prepare themselves in a same way as for  a real flight, to
 
 
 
All participants were briefed on an uneventful flight from the east to Munich Airport in the early mor
hours. The PF came back from his last rest about 25 minutes prior to the landing to perform the approach and 
landing. In the first phase of the approach, using the autopilot, foreign air traffic control (ATC) communicatio
(‘party line’) between other approaching aircraft and the airport could be heard. Pilots’ tasks were to plan, to 
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monitor and to communicate. When approaching the instrument landing system, it was the PF’s decision when to 
change from autopilot to manual control. To provoke a hazardous situation, at 1.000 ft. above ground level (AGL), a 
gentle wind turned into an illegitimate strong tailwind (16 knots) by a scripted event. The wind information given b
ATC was constantly good over the whole scenario. For pilots, this information given by ATC is binding. Only the 
non-binding wind indicator located at the pilot’s navigation display has shown the real wind strength and direction. 
Such a hazardous situation can occur when the wind turns, because the wind information given by ATC is averaged 
over several minutes. So the situation was inexplicit and uncertain for the participants to make the trade-off betwee
a fuel-saving and economic landing with a noticeable higher risk or the abort of the approach for a safe second try 
(Haslbeck et al., 2012). The chance to go around was given to all participants until 70 ft. 
y 
n 
AGL. At this height, the 
PM was structed to callout ‘go-around’ and abort the approach due to strong tailwind. 
Measurement 
pit were recorded. From these different sources, a comprehensive image of pilots’ decision making 
can be drawn. 
Results 
to 
eriment, but not all could 
clearly recall this situation and thus type 3 and 4 are considered as one joint type here.  
ccomplis e go ro
 Ty   Ty 2  Type    T
 in
 
 
Behavioral data were recorded by three complementary methods. All participants were equipped with a 
head-mounted eye-tracking system (DIKABLIS) to measure their visual behavior (Haslbeck, Schubert, Gontar, & 
Bengler; 2012); pilots’ control inputs were recorded by the flight simulator’s data recorder; finally, video and audio 
data in the cock
 
 
Accomplishment of the go-around according to the different types described in Table 1 was analyzed; 
results are shown in Table 2. The distinction between type 1 and 2 is based upon the gaze data. It was not possible 
distinguish between type 3 and 4, because these pilots could not be asked whether they were aware of the wind in 
that explicit situation. Pilots were asked about this in the debriefing session after the exp
 
Table 2.  
A hm nt of the -a und. 
  pe 1 pe  3/4 otal 
 CPTs 10 4 12 26 
 FOs 14 11 2 27 
 
In a statistical comparison between CPTs and FOs, significant differences between both groups were fo
using the chi-squared test: χ²(2)=11.02; p = .004. Because two cells contained less than fiv
und 
e cases, Fisher Exact 
Probabil
he 
 (t2): 
 check showed a 
consider le difference: U = 49; z = 3.41; p < .001; r = .645, indicating a very large effect.  
 
Discussion 
 
decision can be characterized. Two different statements were given by 
PnGAs c
Type 3: 
ity Test was additionally used. This test also shows significant results (p = .004). 
Comparison of gaze behavior of pilots who took the decision to go around (PGA) and pilots intending to 
land (PnGA) led to distinct results. Statistical analysis was carried out using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. Effect 
size is expressed in units of a bivariate correlation coefficient r, as suggested by Rosenthal and Rosnow (2007). T
time of first wind check (t1) was markedly earlier for PGA than for PnGA: U = 89; z = 2.11; p = .035; r = .399, 
indicating a medium to large effect. There was no significant difference in regard of the time of last wind check
U = 137.5; z = 0.54; p = .597; r = .102. The difference between the time of first and last wind
ab
 
The results of this study show that long-haul captains with a lower level of practice and training but a high 
level of operational experience show significantly more willingness to land in a risky situation with strong tailwind 
than short-haul first officers do. Thus Hypothesis 1 is supported/not supported by the data. When thinking about this
behavior, the question arises, how a ‘better’ 
orresponding to type 3 and 4:  
The pilot was aware of the tailwind, but decided to land. In the concrete situation of Munich 
Airport (MUC) a tailwind landing may be an acceptable risk for someone. Both runways have a 
551
length of 4.000m each, which offer a certain safety margin (for comparison longest runway 15R at 
Boston 3.073m). In addition, some pilots are aware of the fact, that performing a missed approach 
Type 4: 
is also a challenge after several hours of flight duty and so they tend to avoid the go-around. 
The pilot was not aware of the tailwind and thus the risk of this situation. Some reasons can be 
fatigue, high workload or a complacent behavior towards the wind situation because of safe win
information given by ATC. This case means insufficient 
d 
airmanship and yields a higher risk in 
s 
er’ 
e limitation of this analysis is the fact, that type 3 and 4 couldn’t be clearly distinguished after the 
experim
sed on 
nGA 
f 
form 
havioral or decision 
strategie
ely 
d 
ppropriately; e. g. by reducing the gaze angle 
necessar
 
f between safe flight operation and economic constraints, 
while in reality the tendency to go around seems lower. 
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